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When liberties are taken away and when democratic institutions die, is it even worse
than human beings dying? This is the query that came to my mind when writing to a
colleague and friend this Wednesday. His immediate answer, that when institutions
die, people end up living as if they are dead, touched a raw nerve.
-

Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena,
September 12, 20101

There has been a deafening global silence in response to Sri Lanka’s actions,
especially from its most influential friends. The international community cannot be
selective in its approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights.
Impunity anywhere is a threat to international peace and security everywhere.
- Kofi Annan, former United Nations Secretary-General and Member, The Elders,
August 3, 2010 2
Introduction

This overview analyzes the state and the underlying causes of the current breakdown of the
rule of law in Sri Lanka. The information herein is drawn primarily (but not exclusively)
from three sources:
1

“Death chant for democracy,” The Sunday Times (of Sri Lanka), September 12, 2010, at
http://sundaytimes.lk/100912/Columns/focus.html.
2

Statement made as part of The Elders’ Media Relapse, Sri Lanka’s disturbing actions met by ‘deafening
global silence’, 3 Aug 2010, available at http://theelders.org/media/mediareleases/sri-lankas-disturbingactions-met-by-deafening-global-silence. The Elders are an independent group of global leaders, brought
together by Nelson Mandela in 2007, who offer their collective influence and experience to support peacebuilding, help address major causes of human suffering and promote the shared interests of humanity. The
Elders are Martti Ahtisaari, Kofi Annan, Ela Bhatt, Lakhdar Brahimi, Gro Brundtland, Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, Jimmy Carter, Graça Machel, Mary Robinson and Desmond Tutu (Chair). Nelson
Mandela and Aung San Suu Kyi are honorary Elders. The Media Release starts with the following
paragraph: “The Sri Lankan government’s clampdown on domestic critics and its disdain for human
rights deserves a far tougher response according to The Elders. While welcoming the end of the decadeslong civil war, the Elders say that meaningful progress on reconciliation in Sri Lanka is still desperately
needed. They describe the international response to Sri Lanka’s worrying approach to human rights, good
governance and accountability as a ‘deafening global silence’ that may encourage other states to act in a
similar way.” Annan’s statement was accompanied by statements from other Elders, including Martti
Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, who said: “Countries operating outside international norms watch
each other carefully. They will be taking courage from Sri Lanka’s apparent success at avoiding
international reproach. This is a worry for all those who want to see more democracy, greater respect for
human rights and less violence in the world.”
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•

Basil Fernando, Sri Lanka: Impunity, Criminal Justice & Human Rights (Asian
Human Rights Commission: Hong Kong, 2010) 3

•

Justice in retreat: A report on the independence of the legal profession and the rule of
law in Sri Lanka (International Bar Association Human Rights Institute [IBAHRI]:
London May 2009) 4

•

Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena, The Rule of Law in Decline in Sri Lanka- Study on the
Prevalence, Determinants and Causes of Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment (Rehabilitation and Research Centre for Torture Victims:
Copenhagen, 2009) 5

The Pinto-Jayawardena report provides a detailed analysis of the causes behind the
breakdown of the rule of law in Sri Lanka, while Fernando’s work provides a conceptual and
critical analysis of overarching themes that is extremely useful for understanding the situation
in Sri Lanka. Facts and figures were also drawn from a wealth of other reports and analyses
published by a range of actors, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the
International Commission of Jurists, Reporters Without Borders, the International Crisis
Group, United Nations Human Rights Council Special Rapporteurs, the European Union, and
the Office of War Crimes Issues of the United States Department of State. 6

In Sri Lanka: Impunity, Criminal Justice and Human Rights, Basil Fernando describes the
current situation in Sri Lanka as one of “abysmal lawlessness”. Lawlessness of this sort
differs from simple illegality or disregard for law, which to differing degrees can happen
anywhere. Lawlessness is abysmal when law ceases to be a reference at all. What would
3

Available for download at http://www.ahrchk.net/pub/mainfile.php/slimpunity/.

4

Available for download at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=7df2962f-7769-4faf8e16-6371b408c174.
5

Available for download at http://www.ruleoflawsrilanka.org/resources/THE-RULE-OF-LAW-OFDECLINE.pdf/view. For information on the Rehabilitation and Research Centre for Torture Victims, see
http://www.uk.rct.dk.
6

See the various sources cited throughout this document. The purpose of this brief overview is not to
duplicate the wealth of detail found in these other reports, and the occasional examples used in this
overview represent merely the tip of the iceberg. For that reason, readers are encouraged to consult these
reports, most of which have executive summaries; the web addresses of each source are part of each
citation.
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normally be crime ceases to be thought of as crime and lawlessness becomes routine. Of
special relevance to the theme of the breakdown of the rule of law is that, under
circumstances of abysmal lawlessness, the concept of legal redress – which is vital to the
proper functioning of any legal system – has in fact been completely decoupled from
whatever may be called law. In Sri Lanka, the primary cause of this decoupling has been the
fundamental failure of the institutions responsible for the implementation of legal redress.

Sri Lanka’s justice and accountability institutions have been eroded to the point that they
have become not simply dysfunctional but also sham institutions – institutions that are little
more than hollow impressions that merely approximate some of the external characteristics of
genuine, functional institutions. Sri Lanka does not lack for a constitution, a court system,
and other formal mechanisms for legal redress; however, none of these institutions have
much more depth or substance to them than a Hollywood film set. In other writing,
Fernando has invoked the medical metaphor of the phantom limb to evocatively convey this
chasm between appearance and reality with respect to the institutions of Sri Lanka’s legal
system:
A medical doctor who attended a presentation I made on the absence of institutions for
administrations of justice and its impact on human rights suggested the term “phantom
limb”. In response to my speech, he said that the situation I described was known as the
phantom limb syndrome. An amputee who has lost a limb continues to imagine that he
has that limb and even feels pain in the limb. The problem of institutions for
administration of justice is similar. Because certain institutions were formed at certain
times in history, particularly colonial times, this has given rise to the feeling that these
institutions still exist and function more or less as before. In this way they become
phantom limbs. 7
The numerous commissions of inquiry that have been appointed over the past several decades
to address human rights concerns in Sri Lanka illustrate this phenomenon perfectly.
Paralleling Fernando’s phantom-limb theme, Amnesty International refers to this period as

7

Basil Fernando, “A three-part study on the crisis in institutions for administration of justice in Sri Lanka and its
consequences for the realisation of human rights in Asia”, June 28, 2010, at
http://www.article2.org/mainfile.php/0902/377/, referencing
Morten Koch Andersen and Basil Fernando, The phantom limb: Failing judicial systems, torture and
human rights work in Sri Lanka (Asian Human Rights Commission, 2009), which is available for
download at www.ahrchk.net/pub/pdf/ThePhantomLimb.pdf.
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“twenty years of make believe”. 8 Outwardly, commissions of inquiry in Sri Lanka are
designed to resemble other similar institutions around the world that undertake credible
investigations and produce meaningful findings. However, as incarnated in Sri Lanka they
currently serve little more purpose than to either relieve domestic pressure or to discredit a
previous government. Governments frequently are so brazen as to tailor a particular
commission's mandate to specifically restrict its investigations to a time period coinciding
with a particular predecessor regime. Evidence is also frequently manipulated.
Recommendations are usually ignored and preliminary findings of responsibility are rarely
followed through with judicial proceedings. Reports are frequently released to the public only
after long delays, or in certain cases not at all. Institutional limitations also abound. For
example, there are no built-in safeguards to protect the safety of victims and witnesses. Also,
commissioners can be removed at the unreviewable discretion of the president and therefore
lack independence.

In 2006, the Commission of Inquiry to Investigate and Inquire into Alleged Serious
Violations of Human Rights was established. In response to concerns over the problems
associated with past commissions, Sri Lanka’s President invited a panel of eleven
international experts to supervise the Commission's process and ensure its integrity. This
International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) was chaired by the former
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India, P. N. Bhagwati, and included as members such
persons as Bernard Kouchner. Following a series of public statements throughout 2007
expressing serious concerns, the experts of the IIGEP had had enough by March 2008. Citing
persistent interference by the Attorney General as well as a lack of transparency, lack of
timeliness in proceedings, lack of victim and witness protection, lack of financial
independence and lack of cooperative state bodies, they tendered their resignations en masse.
Noting further that the recommendations contained in their interim reports had largely gone
ignored, they concluded that there was "an absence of political and institutional will on the
part of the Government to pursue with vigour the cases under review" 9 – definitively putting
8

Amnesty International, Twenty Years of Make Believe: Sri Lanka’s Commissions of Inquiry, 2009,
available for download at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA37/005/2009/en

9

See IIGEP, Public Statement, March 6, 2008, available at
http://transcurrents.com/tamiliana/archives/566. The Public Statement indicated a final report would be
released, which appeared the next month as IIGEP, The Final Report of the IICEP (Final Statement: The
Members of the IIGEP Submit Their Concluding Public Statement on the Work of the Commission of
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to rest any lingering doubts as to the true nature of Sri Lankan commissions of inquiry. Four
Sri Lankan commissioners of the Commission of Inquiry also resigned. 11 The Attorney
General’s response to the international experts’ criticism was to release a statement accusing
the international experts of being involved in an international ‘sinister plot’. 12

We are witnessing what appears to be the same manipulation and deceit with respect to a new
commission of inquiry, the Commission on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation (LLRC),
which has been established by the government of Sri Lanka in an effort to deflect criticism
and to claim that real efforts are being made to address claims of war crimes and other human
rights violations in the final stages of the war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE). Perhaps the best way to convey the state of affairs is to reproduce at some length an
assessment of the Office of War Crimes Issues of US Department of State released in midAugust 2010. One purpose of the report is to narrate the evolution of two purportedly
independent investigative bodies established by Sri Lanka since the Department submitted an
earlier report to Congress on October 21, 2009; that earlier report identified over 300 reports
of incidents in the final months of the war that merited investigation for possible war crimes
and crimes against humanity. The following extract employs the device of adding emphasis
(by way of italics) in order to direct the reader’s attention to facts that, however carefully and
even diplomatically expressed, clearly reveal reasons to distrust whether the requisite
“political and institutional will” (to return to the language used by the IIGEP) of the
government of Sri Lanka is any more present now than during the 2006-2008 episode:
Immediately following the release of the October 2009 Department of State
report [on crimes against humanity during the war in Sri Lanka] to Congress,
Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa appointed a “Group of Eminent
Persons” to look into the allegations in the U.S. report and prepare a report for
him with its recommendations. The group’s report was initially due to
President Rajapaksa on December 31, 2009, but the due date was subsequently
delayed to April 2010 and then again to July 2010. …

Inquiry and Find a Lack of Political Will to Support a Search for the Truth), April 15, 2008, REF: IIGEPPS-006-2006, available for download
at http://www.ruleoflawsrilanka.org/resources/IIGEPnbspSTM.pdf/view.
11

Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka: Events of 2008, at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79245.

12

Asian Human Rights Commission, SRI LANKA: IIGEP episode, AG's department becoming prosecutor
and defender at the same time, Statement AHRC-STM-104-2008, released April 24, 2008, at
http://www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2008statements/1483/?print=yes.
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The Department of State concludes that the Group of Eminent Persons was
ineffective. The Department of State received conflicting reports about the
progress of the Group’s inquiry, and confirmed in May that it had not been
active for months and that its mandate had been subsumed by the new
commission. The Department of State is not aware of any findings or reports of
the Group. The Group did not appear to investigate allegations or to make any
recommendations pursuant to its mandate.
On May 15, [2010] President Rajapaksa issued a warrant to establish an eightmember commission under the Special Presidential Commissions of Inquiry
Law of 1978. The warrant did not explicitly direct the commission to identify
violations of internationally accepted norms in conflict situations or to identify
those responsible. … Since then, the Government of Sri Lanka has clarified the
mandate of the LLRC in private conversations with U.S. Government officials
(although it has not yet done so publicly).
On June 10, the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense announced that President
Rajapaksa had met with the members of the Commission on Lessons Learnt
and Reconciliation on June 4. The Ministry’s announcement said that the
President had informed commission members they had “the responsibility of
acting in a forward-looking manner, through focus on restorative justice
designed to further strengthen national amity.” The statement further noted that
the President encouraged the members to “utilize their wide-ranging mandate to
fulfil this objective, while always safeguarding the dignity of Sri Lanka.” …
Evaluating the effectiveness of the CoI should first take into account the history
of failings of a series of past CoIs established in Sri Lanka. For example, a
2006 commission charged with investigating sixteen allegations of serious
human rights violations ultimately partially investigated only seven of the cases
and did not identify any of the perpetrators. An International Independent
Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) invited by President Rajapaksa to observe
the local commission resigned after concluding that the GSL lacked the
political will to properly pursue the investigations and that the commission was
not meeting international standards in areas such as witness protection,
transparency, and financial commitment to the commission. The IIGEP was
especially critical concerning a severe conflict of interest by the Attorney
General’s office, which both represented the GSL and led questioning during
hearings. The then incumbent Attorney General, who in that capacity was
criticized for obstructing the IIGEP’s work, has been appointed as Chairman of
the LLRC. 13

13

Office of War Crimes Issues, US Department of State, Report To Congress on Measures Taken by the
Government of Sri Lanka and International Bodies To Investigate Incidents During the Recent Conflict in
Sri Lanka, and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Such Efforts, August 11, 2010, available for download at
http://www.state.gov/s/wci/srilanka/releases/145884.htm.
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The preceding italicized passages speak for themselves in terms of illustrating the prospects
for the LLRC acting as a bona fide commission of inquiry. South Africa’s Bishop Desmond
Tutu had already drawn this conclusion two weeks before the release of the report of the
Office of War Crimes Issues:
The government of Sri Lanka needs to show a much greater commitment to
achieving meaningful reconciliation. The ongoing persecution and
disappearances of human rights activists, journalists and government opponents
is truly terrifying. Unfortunately, previous internal commissions have done little
to reveal the truth behind human rights abuses. It is doubtful that the President’s
‘Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission’ will help Sri Lankans to
work towards lasting peace and reconciliation. 14
With the commissions of inquiry example having set the scene, the remainder of this
overview document discusses the overall rule of law situation in Sri Lanka in terms of six
themes identified by Basil Fernando as lying at the heart of the current situation of abysmal
lawlessness in Sri Lanka:

1.

lost meaning of legality;

2.

predominance of the security apparatus;

3.

disappearance of truth through propaganda;

4.

extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of the executive president;

5. destroyed public institutions;
6.

zero status of citizens.

These themes provide a useful lens through which to gain an overview of the breakdown of
the rule of law in Sri Lanka.

The Lost Meaning of Legality

Fernando describes the law in Sri Lanka today as an “exercise in futility”. He traces this
problem back to the 1978 Constitution, which, according to him, “destroyed constitutional
law” by negating all checks and balances over the executive president. This has slowly led to

14

Bishop Desmond Tutu, Chairperson, The Elders, statement made as part of The Elders, Sri Lanka’s
disturbing actions met by ‘deafening global silence’, Media Release, 3 Aug 2010, available at
http://theelders.org/media/mediareleases/sri-lankas-disturbing-actions-met-by-deafening-global-silence.

8

the irrelevance of the supreme law and, gradually, all other law. Public institutions have also
accordingly lost all their power and value. As Fernando puts it:
When there is a loss of meaning in legality, terms such as “judge”, “lawyer”,
“state counsel” and “police officer” are superficially used as in the past; however,
their inner meanings are substantially changed. Those who bear such titles no
longer have similar authority, power and responsibility as their counterparts had
before, when law still had meaning as an organizing principle.15
While such individuals hold the same nominal office, the manner in which they discharge
their official duties has changed. They no longer carry out their duties in conformity with the
rule of law. For instance, under standard criminal procedure there is normally an obligation to
investigate all crimes. In Sri Lanka, however, such investigations are carried out selectively.
This unofficial expansion of investigative discretion has in turn made possible the nowcommonplace tactic of harassing an enemy or political opponent by causing completely
bogus criminal inquiries to be launched. The criminal investigation process has been co-opted
from a mode of maintaining law and order to a tool through which not only to withhold
protection from citizens but also to actively intimidate and victimize them. For example,
when 133 well-known Sri Lankans signed a letter condemning death threats against a civil
society activist, the Criminal Investigation Division selectively carried out an investigation
not of the death threats but of the propriety of the signatories’ actions.

The ineffectiveness of public institutions to maintain law and order has allowed underground
elements to take over the functions of ‘law enforcement’. More and more actors, both private
and institutional, turn to criminal elements to achieve their ends. This is reflected in the
“government policy to abduct and kill… [individuals] to be eliminated for political
advantage. The method of killing is, like the collecting of debts, now cheaper, quicker and
less risky than going through the courts”. 16 As legal redress becomes more the exception
than the rule, the meaning of legality becomes corrupted further and further.

15
16

Fernando, Sri Lanka: Impunity, p 22
Fernando, Sri Lanka: Impunity, 23.
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The Predominance of the Security Apparatus

Beginning with the insurgencies in Sri Lanka in 1971, and continuing through the conflict
with the LTTE, the country’s security apparatus has emerged as a very powerful actor. This
status is not expected to diminish despite the declared end of the conflict a year ago. Many of
the ‘emergency’ measures introduced during the course of the conflict have not been
repealed.

The targets of the security apparatus are ordinary citizens with a special focus on trade
unionists, journalists, members of civil society organizations, officials and activists in
opposition political parties, and people participating in acts of protest. All aspects of Sri
Lankan life have now come under surveillance. It is particularly keen to exert control over the
electoral process, and does so by targeting the grassroots activities of opposition parties and
even ruling party members when internal competition arises.

Legislative measures such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) have given the security
apparatus much of the power it now holds. However, it is important to note that the security
apparatus is by no means constrained by the legal limits of its statutorily conferred authority.
With the loss of the meaning of legality there is nothing to prevent it from continuing to do
so. A culture has arisen where any calls for accountability are denounced as anti-patriotic and
akin to treason, sabotage, or aiding and abetting terrorism.

Accordingly, extrajudicial disappearances, torture, and killings are commonplace and, in the
name of counter-terrorism through total war, atrocities against both civilians and surrendered
LTTE fighters were equally commonplace in the final months of the war. 17 Meanwhile over
17

See, for example, (1) International Crisis Group, War Crimes in Sri Lanka, May 17, 2010 , available for
download at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/191-war-crimes-in-srilanka.aspx – “The Sri Lankan security forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) repeatedly
violated international humanitarian law during the last five months of their 30-year civil war. Although
both sides committed atrocities throughout the many years of conflict, the scale and nature of violations
particularly worsened from January 2009 to the government’s declaration of victory in May. Evidence
gathered by the International Crisis Group suggests that these months saw tens of thousands of Tamil
civilian men, women, children and the elderly killed, countless more wounded, and hundreds of thousands
deprived of adequate food and medical care, resulting in more deaths. The eventual destruction of the
LTTE militarily came at the cost of immense civilian suffering and an acute challenge to the laws of war.
It also undermined the credibility of the United Nations and further entrenched a bitterness among Tamils
in Sri Lanka and elsewhere which may make a durable peace elusive. Now a number of other countries are
10

a year after the purported end of the conflict, 8-10,000 detainees still languish in detention
considering ‘the Sri Lankan option’ – unrestrained military action, refusal to negotiate, disregard for
humanitarian issues – as a way to deal with insurgencies and other violent groups.”; (2) Human Rights
Watch, Recurring Nightmare: State Responsibility for “Disappearances” and Abductions in Sri Lanka,
March 2008, available for download at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/03/05/recurring-nightmare-0
– “Hundreds of enforced disappearances committed since 2006 have already placed Sri Lanka among the
countries with the highest number of new cases in the world. The victims are primarily young ethnic Tamil
men who ‘disappear’—often after being picked up by government security forces in the country’s
embattled north and east, but also in the capital Colombo. Some may be members or supporters of the
LTTE, but this does not justify their detention in secret or without due process. Most are feared dead. In
the face of this crisis, the government of Sri Lanka has demonstrated an utter lack of resolve to investigate
and prosecute those responsible.” (p 5); (3) Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak: MISSION TO SRI LANKA, UN Doc.
A/HRC/7/3/Add.6, 26 February 2008, available for download at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/7session/reports.htm – “70. …[I]n the context of
detention orders under the Emergency Regulations and in particular with respect to LTTE suspects, the
clear majority of all detainees interviewed by the Special Rapporteur complained about a broad variety of
methods of torture, some extremely brutal. In many cases, these allegations were corroborated by forensic
evidence. The considerable number of clearly established cases of torture by TID and other security forces,
together with various efforts by TID to hide evidence and to obstruct the investigations of the Special
Rapporteur, leads him to the conclusion that torture has become a routine practice in the context of
counter-terrorism operations, both by the police and the armed forces…. 71. Methods of torture reported
included beating with various weapons, beating on the soles of the feet (falaqa), blows to the ears
(telephono), positional abuse when handcuffed or bound, suspension in various positions, including
strappado, “butchery”, “reversed butchery” and “parrot’s perch” (or dharma chakara), burning with metal
objects and cigarettes, asphyxiation with plastic bags with chilli pepper or gasoline, and various forms of
genital torture. This array of torture finds its fullest manifestation at the TID detention facility in Boosa.
The Special Rapporteur is also shocked by the brutality of some of the torture measures applied to persons
suspected of being LTTE members, such as burnings with soldering irons and suspension by the thumbs.
The latter method was allegedly applied by the army.”; (4) Technical Note prepared by the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Mr. Philip Alston, in relation to the
authenticity of the “Channel 4 videotape”, January 2010, available for download at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/index.htm – “On 25 August 2009, a United Kingdom
television station released video footage which appears to show the summary execution of Tamils by Sri
Lankan soldiers. A group named Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka claimed that the killings had
been filmed in January 2009 by a Sri Lankan soldier with a mobile phone. This was at a time when the
international media did not have access to the conflict zone. Since the video’s release, the Government of
Sri Lanka has claimed that the video is a fake. Over the past four months, I have been engaged in a series
of communications with the Government about this video, in which I requested it to conduct an
independent investigation. While the Government initially refused to do so, on 7 September 2009, it
issued a response stating that it had commissioned four separate investigations, and that they ‘have now
scientifically established beyond any doubt that this video is a fake’. At the time, I expressed concern
about the objectivity of the investigations, in part because two of the “independent experts” worked for the
Sri Lankan armed forces. Some of the reports seemed more impressionistic than scientific, and I have
never been provided the full version of the reports. I decided that it was incumbent upon me to commission
independent and impartial evaluations of the videotape. I retained three experts: in forensic pathology …,
forensic video analysis …, and firearm evidence ….. Together, the reports by these experts strongly
suggest that the video is authentic….While there are some unexplained elements in the video, there are
strong indications of its authenticity. In addition, most of the arguments relied upon by the Government of
Sri Lanka to impugn the video have been shown to be flawed. In light of these conclusions, and of the
persistent flow of other allegations concerning alleged extrajudicial executions committed by both sides
during the closing phases of the war against the LTTE, I call for an independent inquiry to be established
to carry out an impartial investigation into war crimes and other grave violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law allegedly committed in Sri Lanka.”
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camps accused of being members of the LTTE. 18 They have not been formally charged, nor
have they been allowed legal representation or access to any procedure to review the legality
of their detention. Allegations of mistreatment also abound, but no humanitarian agencies –
not even the International Committee of the Red Cross – have been allowed access to the
detainees, a flagrant violation of international law.

The Disappearance of Truth through Propaganda

Years of conflict have exerted a calamitous effect on the propagation of truth in Sri Lanka.
Equal in strategic importance to territorial struggle during the conflict was the struggle for
control over information. The military and the LTTE both vied to cast their polarized
propagandistic perspectives as the single version of the truth.

The state has learned to excel at creating and controlling a single, official version of the truth.
Society, for its part, has largely accepted the state’s self-anointed role as arbiter of truth and
falsehood. As Fernando observes, “those who run the media also usually comply with

18

Human Rights Watch, Legal Limbo - The Uncertain Fate of Detained LTTE Suspects in Sri Lanka, 2
February 2010 – “ The Sri Lankan government is currently detaining at least 11,000 people, including
more than 550 children, in so-called “rehabilitation centers.” These individuals, said to be associated with
the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), were among the almost 300,000 displaced
persons confined in detention camps in the final months of the armed conflict with the LTTE. The
government has routinely violated the detainees’ fundamental human rights, including the right to be
informed of specific reasons for arrest, the right to challenge the lawfulness of the detention before an
independent judicial authority, and the right of access to legal counsel and family members. The
authorities’ consistent failure to inform families of the basis for the detainees’ arrest and their whereabouts
raises serious concerns that some detainees may have been victims of torture and ill-treatment, which are
more likely to take place where due process of law is lacking and which have long been serious problems
in Sri Lanka. Given the lack of information about some detainees, there is also a risk that some may have
been “disappeared.”…Concerns about the fate of detainees are aggravated by Sri Lanka’s appalling record
of enforced disappearances.”; and International Commission of Jurists, Beyond Lawful Constraints: Sri
Lanka’s Mass Detention of LTTE Suspects, September 2010, available for download at
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=349&sessID=&langage=1&myPage=Legal_Documentation&id=2
3159 – “This report addresses human rights concerns arising from what may be the largest mass
administrative detention anywhere in the world. The Government of Sri Lanka is currently holding
approximately eight thousand individuals under administrative detention without charge or trial. They are
alleged former associates of the LTTE and therefore required to undergo ‘rehabilitation’ under Sri Lanka’s
2005 emergency regulations. Hundreds of others have been screened and held separately for criminal
prosecution. The ICJ is concerned that the Government’s ‘surrendee’ and ‘rehabilitation’ regime fails to
adhere to international law and standards, jeopardizing the rights to liberty, due process and fair trial.
There are also allegations of torture and enforced disappearance. Access required for reliable and accurate
monitoring by international agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), has
been denied.”
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demands to reproduce and disseminate government propaganda. Those who do not comply
are threatened”. IBAHRI notes that the media have reached this point through years of
intimidation. Journalistic voices critical of the government’s security measures have been
routinely named by the Ministry of Defence as ‘Tiger sympathisers’, ‘LTTE supporters’ or
‘terrorists’. Frequently, this is a precursor to a threat or physical attack against the journalists.
At least 14 media workers have been murdered since the beginning of 2006, with many
others receiving death threats and suffering physically assaults or vandalised properties. In
many cases journalists are forced to flee the country. The state has also proven adept at using
institutional channels to subvert press freedom.

For instance, in August 2009, J.S. Tissainayagam, a journalist who had written critically of
the government’s military campaign, was sentenced to 20 years of hard labour in what was
the first conviction of a journalist for his writings under the PTA. A high-profile journalist
who was critical of government conduct, Lasantha Wickrematunge, was assassinated in
January 2009; he had prepared an editorial to be published in the event of his murder in
which the following words appears: “no other profession calls on its practitioners to lay down
their lives for their art save the armed forces and, in Sri Lanka, journalism.... Electronic and
print-media institutions have been burnt, bombed, sealed and coerced. Countless journalists
have been harassed, threatened and killed. It has been my honour to belong to all those
categories and now especially the last”. 19 On 24 January 2010,

journalist Prageeth

Ekneligoda disappeared and has not been heard of since; Prageeth regularly contributed
to LankaeNews web site and is a political analyst and a cartoonist known for his outspoken
views critical of the government. These are just three of many examples that could have been
chosen. So dismal is the situation, in fact, that Reporters Without Borders ranked Sri Lanka
162 of 175 countries in its 2009 Press Freedom Index. 20

19

Lasanth Wickrematunge, “And Then They Came for Me”, The Sunday Leader, January 11, 2009 at
http://www.thesundayleader.lk/archive/20090111/editorial-.htm.
20

See more generally Reporters Without Borders at http://en.rsf.org/sri-lanka.html for a large number of
entries of incidents in Sri Lanka relating to the freedom and security of journalists. For a digest of monthly
updates on developments and incidents in Sri Lanka between September 2003 and September 2010, see the
International Crisis Group Crisis Watch at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publicationtype/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?CountryIDs={E3AEAB0F-4DC7-4926-95103165AA4F182B}.
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The legal profession has been similarly conditioned. On 28 January 2009, Amitha Arayatne,
who had acted in several prominent human rights cases, received death threats from police
officers. Two days later, his house was burned. Such incidents have been effective at
reducing the number of lawyers willing to take on human rights cases. In March 2009, the
lawyer representing Sunil Shantha, who was accusing the police of torture, suddenly
withdrew from the case on account of threats from police.

As a result of these dynamics, there is a general level of societal disinterest in truth itself.
When the truth is so cynically manipulated, Fernando explains, “people cease expecting to
know the truth of anything.” As a result, government spokespeople automatically deny any
allegations of human rights violations, knowing that no one will come forward to speak what
they know due to fear or a sense of sheer futility.

The Concentration of Power in the Hands of the President

Fernando attributes the current breakdown of the rule of law in Sri Lanka in part to the high
concentration of power conferred upon the executive president under the 1978 Constitution.
Under that document, the president gained:
•

absolute immunity from lawsuits of any kind;

•

all the powers of cabinet, including control over the civil service;

•

the power to appoint or dismiss the prime minister at will; and

•

the ability to dissolve parliament a year after its election.

According to Fernando, the underlying principle of such a heavy concentration of power in
the hands of the presidency is rooted in the belief that such a system is the only effective way
to govern the country. However, with all the checks and balances on executive presidential
power removed, this system has also exposed the office of president to abuses of power. The
concentration in the executive presidency of responsibilities far greater than one person can
possibly manage has led to poor oversight and dysfunction in public institutions. This has
exacerbated the breakdown in the rule of law.

14

To partially address this problem, Parliament in 2001 passed the 17th Amendment to the
Constitution. This created a Constitutional Council with the power to recommend or approve
the appointment of a number of key positions within the public service. These positions
included the Attorney General, the Inspector General of Police and the Chief Justice. The
passing of the amendment was intended to restore a measure of independence to institutions
of governance as the appointment process had become too politically biased in favour of the
president. However, the Constitutional Council has been in abeyance since 2005 when the
term of the first Council lapsed and the President refused to appoint successors who had been
selected by the various parties in accordance with the constitution. The President’s failure to
appoint cannot be directly challenged in court due to his legal immunity under Article 35 of
the Constitution. Nevertheless, litigation has been launched alleging that the nonimplementation of the 17th Amendment is a violation of the constitutional right to equality
before the law. The power of the Chief Justice to make the appointments, if the President
refuses to do so, is also unresolved. According to the IBAHRI, “the non-implementation of
the 17th Amendment represents one of the most critical unresolved rule of law issues in the
country” 21.

A culmination of this concentration of vast and unchecked power in the hands of one person
is plainly evident in the successful initiative of President Rajapaksa to have Parliament adopt
an 18th Amendment to the Constitution this month (September 2010). The 18th amendment
removes the current constitutional limitations on the number of terms that a president can
serve and abolishes the Constitutional Council altogether.

It vests in the President an

unlimited power of appointment of the entire membership of a large number of crucial
standing commissions as well as of key office-holders, subject only to a duty to “seek the
observations” of five people – the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Leader of the Opposition,
a nominee of the Prime Minister, and a nominee of the Leader of the Opposition. 22

21
22

IBAHRI, Justice in Retreat, pp 23-24.

See the downloadable PDF of an An Act to Amend the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic
of Sri Lanka, L.D. O 19/2010, at http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2010/09/03/proposed-18th-amendment-tothe-sri-lankan-constitution-full-text/. The commissions whose entire memberships will be decided by the
President are: the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, the National Police Commission, the Public
Service Commission, the Election Commission, the Permanent Commission to Investigate Allegations of
Bribery and Corruption, the Finance Commission, and the Delimitation Commission. The office-holders
who will be appointed solely by the President are: the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and each judge
on that court; the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal and every judge on that court; the Attorney-General;
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Destroyed Public Institutions

Fernando argues that through the combined effect of the aforementioned four elements, the
administration of justice in Sri Lanka has been effectively destroyed. This topic has been the
subject of much of the work of the Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) and the Asian
Legal Resource Centre (ALRC). In his book, Fernando reviews this work in order to
catalogue the descent into disgrace of the police, the Attorney General’s department, and the
judiciary. In each case, the institution has degenerated to the point where today it appears to
serve no other purpose than to provide cover for abuses of power and rights violations
perpetrated by the state. As a result, “there is nothing sacrosanct or predetermined about any
institutional practices now, and the citizen who goes before public institutions knows not
what to expect” 23.

Pinto-Jayawardena identifies two factors in particular that lie at the root of Sri Lanka’s failed
public institutions. These are political interference from the executive, and a lack of public
resources. 24

the Auditor-General; the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Parliament’s Ombudsman); the
Secretary-General of Parliament; and members of the Judicial Service Commission (with, for some reason,
the specific exception of the Chairman).
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Fernando, Sri Lanka: Impunity, p 27.
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Apart from the report cited earlier (Pinto-Jayawardena, The Rule of Law in Decline in Sri Lanka- Study
on the Prevalence, Determinants and Causes of Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment), see also: Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena, Post-War Justice in Sri Lanka: Rule of Law,
the Criminal Justice System and Commissions of Inquiry (International Commission of Jurists, January
2010), available for download at
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=349&sessID=&langage=1&myPage=Legal_Documentation&id=2
2931; International Crisis Group, Sri Lanka’s Judiciary: Politicised Rights, Compromised Courts, June 28,
2009, available for download at www.crisisgroup.org/.../srilanka/172_sri_lankas_judiciary___politicised_courts__compromised_rights.ashx; and Françoise Hampson,
Leif Sevón and Roman Wieruszewski, The Implementation of Certain Human Rights Conventions in Sri
Lanka: Final Report, 30 September 2009, Expert report prepared at the request of the European
Commission, available for download at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/october/tradoc_145153.pdf.
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The key to any successfully functioning judiciary is judicial independence. However, the
judiciary in Sri Lanka cannot be said any longer to enjoy judicial independence. This is a
change that has occurred over the past decade or so. As Pinto-Jayawardena comments,
Most importantly, despite the terror of the [nineteen] eighties, there were the courts….
The point is that the judiciary (largely as a whole) kept their integrity intact during
that period. A constituency of public opinion recognised the core importance of
constitutional institutions in general and an independent judiciary in particular. This
faith was kept alive and enabled judges to stand up against aggressive political
authority, sometimes in the most dangerous of moments. 26
Many observers point to the 1999 appointment of then-Attorney General Sarath N. Silva to
the office of Chief Justice as a watershed moment in the degeneration of the judiciary. Mr
Silva had close ties to the then-President. Once a credible defender of fundamental rights and
an important check on executive power, the office of Chief Justice has decayed to its current
weakened and docile state. Silva’s appointment came amidst a flurry of executive backlash
against a Supreme Court which it saw as unduly intrusive in government affairs. The
appointment was accompanied by a perceptible shift in the Court’s attitude towards
fundamental rights petitions. According to the IBAHRI report, Chief Justice Silva had a
domineering personality which he used to maximum effect by assigning the most politically
sensitive cases to himself and the most junior judges. 27 For example, a petition against his
appointment to the Supreme Court was dismissed by a five-judge bench comprising (by his
own order) himself and the four most junior judges. On two other occasions, Parliament
attempted to effect his removal with impeachment motions, only to be thwarted by the
President’s summary dissolution of the legislature.

The executive also interferes habitually in the affairs of the judiciary. For instance, the
IBAHRI notes that, in one speech in 2008, the President Rajapaksa issued thinly-veiled
threats of violence and impeachment to the judges of the Supreme Court.28 These threats
must be read against the lack of institutional guarantees for judicial independence: any judge
of the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court can be removed by an order of the president
26

“Death chant for democracy,” The Sunday Times (of Sri Lanka), September 12, 2010, at
http://sundaytimes.lk/100912/Columns/focus.html.
27

IBAHRI, Justice in Retreat, p 85.

28

IBAHRI, Justice in Retreat, p 31.

17

supported by a simple majority in Parliament. The situation has not improved since the
release of the IBAHRI report in 2009. The lack of judicial independence for the judiciary has
led to its politicization, and is just one example of the erosion of public institutions in Sri
Lanka.

Institutions which are set up to act as checks upon state action lack proper insulation from
political interference. The section above has already described how the Constitutional
Council, designed to inject a measure of impartiality in the heavily politicized appointments
process, was undermined by the executive. Various elements of the state security apparatus
are not properly insulated from institutions that are ostensibly designed to investigate and
address complaints against them. For example, the unit responsible for investigating
allegations of torture against police is composed of police officers who are often transferred
in and out of the unit. They are effectively assigned to investigate their own colleagues.
Under such circumstances, it is impossible to expect fully independent and impartial
investigations. The result, unsurprisingly, has been a near-complete failure to follow up
allegations of torture against the police.

The lack of resources is the second major problem that severely compromises the capacity of
public institutions, including the courts, to fulfil their roles. Due to lack of resources, public
institutions are understaffed. Their personnel lack the proper training for their posts. This
only adds to the Sisyphean challenge of resurrecting these institutions from their already
dysfunctional state.

The Zero Status of Citizens

As the performance of the country’s public institutions has fallen towards zero, so in effect
has the status of its citizens. Where there are no effective public institutions there can be no
meaningful individual rights. The rights that citizens enjoy under the statute books have no
actual relevance because there is no effective mechanism to guarantee them. As the nation’s
public institutions have vanished, so has any conception of Sri Lankans’ individual rights.

Perhaps the starkest example of this zero status can be seen in the detention camps. At the
height of the situation, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons were detained.
18

The operation of these camps contravened a number of obligations within international
human rights law and humanitarian law. 30 The situation highlighted the current reality in Sri
Lanka – that its citizens are subject not to the rule of law, but to the naked political power of
the ruling government.

Although the detention camps provided a dramatic illustration, it is important to reiterate that
it is not just internally displaced persons in Sri Lanka that have zero status. All citizens right
up to the members of the privileged elite have a zero status. For these individuals, even their
relative wealth and power cannot afford them access to public institutions that have been
destroyed. The rule of law has vanished with respect to all Sri Lankans. Fernando chronicles
how, from time to time, members of the ruling class are surprised to learn that their position
in the hierarchy does not make them invulnerable to (legally) arbitrary treatment. Often – as
in the case of the prosecution for sedition of General Fonseka – these individuals were
themselves active in the repressive state structure before the system turned against them.

Summary

In broad strokes, the collapse of the rule of law in Sri Lanka can be reduced to the following.
The legitimacy of Sri Lanka’s public institutions has been destroyed through years of undue
political interference from the executive and through the involvement of public institutions in
the perpetration of repression. Mechanisms that could partially address deficiencies in
institutional independence, such as the Constitutional Council, the courts, or commissions of
inquiry, have been systematically sabotaged by the executive. Further, perceived security
threats have given the executive an excuse to maintain much of the power it now holds. As a
result of this situation, there is no longer an expectation on the part of Sri Lankans that their
public institutions will operate according to the rule of law. At the same time, the concept of
individual rights itself has also been lost. Sri Lankans’ expectations that they will have
anything beyond zero status have also gradually been eroded. When this mentality pervades
not just the general public but also those who hold office in public institutions, the rule of law
is extensively compromised. Meanwhile, because of the disappearance of truth as a public
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See Amnesty International, Unlock the Camps in Sri Lanka: Safety and Dignity for the Displaced Now,
August 2009, available for download at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/unlockcamps-sri-lanka-20090807.
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enterprise – effected by years of government propaganda, manipulation and outright
intimidation of the media – alongside a climate of fear, there is little organized pressure on
the government to address the situation. In all of this, the breakdown of the institutional rule
of law feeds into and feeds from the mindsets of both the persons who staff public institutions
and, increasingly, Sri Lankan society more generally.
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